|'.....communication with Europe appears to have broken down ,Prime Minister'|
This is probably why the British Prime Minister David Cameron has decided to go so quickly, have a look at this research document, written in 2013.
The full paper is on this link: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2013_RP07_olv.pdf
.....and this should be considered along with this extract from the ever excellent Jack of Kent Blog, writing on Article 50 ...
" A UK withdrawal would have profound implications and costs for the UK, far greater than for the EU. Nevertheless, the rest of the EU would face both the unprecedented event of a withdrawal of a member state and, in the case of the UK, the withdrawal of one of its largest members. This could bring about significant changes to the EU. For some, the loss of one of the most economically liberal members could tip the EU towards protectionism, or perhaps trigger a crisis in European integration leading to the EU’s unravelling. Others see the potential for the EU to free itself of its most awkward member, making the EU easier to lead, aiding a solution to the Eurozone’s crises, in turn strengthening the foundations for an ever closer union among the people of Europe."
Article 50 Treaty on European Union
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.
That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.
As should be clear, the potential implications for the EU of a UK withdrawal are unclear and open to much speculation.
This is thanks in part to a lack of discussion of the topic. Indeed, the very idea of discussing a member state withdrawing from the EU remains a taboo subject.
This remains the case despite the inclusion of Article 50 TEU and the growing possibility of a British withdrawal. This taboo should be broken.
Shying away from discussing it only adds to uncertainty which those seeking the UK’s withdrawal benefit from. More importantly, if the EU is to reach a calculated decision about whether or not to press ahead with a renegotiation then it needs to assess whether or not it is worth making the effort to keep the UK inside on renegotiated terms, or whether it might be better to seek a new arrangement altogether with the UK on the outside.
The possibility then of a UK withdrawal presents the EU with a series of questions:
1. Should the EU refuse to discuss the idea of a British withdrawal until a vote to withdraw actually happens?
2. Should the issue of withdrawal be discussed as part of any renegotiation of Britain’s relationship inside the EU?
3. What red-lines should the EU set down for any discussion of withdrawal, either in any renegotiation or during a withdrawal negotiation?
4. How is Britain’s part in European integration – both positive and negative – to be assessed?
5. To what extent would a UK withdrawal help solve the problems with the Eurozone and make possible further progress towards “ever closer union”?
6. What would a UK withdrawal mean for the EU’s international standing and security?
7. What type of relationship would the EU like to have with a UK that has left the EU, and how would this fit with, or change, the EU’s relationships with other non-EU parts of Europe?
8. Should further written clarification be prepared about Article 50 TEU, and if so who is to do this?
9. What processes should the EU follow to manage the internal changes to the EU brought about by a UK withdrawal?
10. How would a UK withdrawal shift the balance of power in the EU and direction of European integration?
Initial answers to these questions should point to how neither the UK nor EU should savour the idea of a British withdrawal. It could be traumatic for both the UK and the EU. This could be especially so for the UK, as it would mean withdrawing from its most important and comprehensive international relationship.
The EU, however, should be under no illusions that the impact on it [the EU] could also be significant.
JULIAN BRAY +44(0)1733 345581 Aviation & Crisis Management Expert, Journalist & Broadcaster, Aviation Security & Airline Operations, Travel / Maritime & Cruise Industry, NUJ, EQUITY, LIVE ISDN LINK, Broadcast ISDN COOBE ++44 (0)1733 345020 e&oe Old faithful NOKIA: 07944 217476 www.aviationcomment.com